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Framing is a motivated process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

George Ainslie Open the ORCID record for George Ainslie [Opens in a new window]
George Ainslie*
Affiliation:
Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320, USA George.Ainslie@va.govwww.picoeconomics.org
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Abstract

Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e221
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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