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Personalizing the demands of reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Charles Kalish*
Affiliation:
Society for Research in Child Development, Washington, DC20006. ckalish@srcd.orghttp://corundum.education.wisc.edu

Abstract

Children come to joint action with a generalized sense of “reason,” which carries normative implications, before personalizing reasons. A general sense of ought precedes specific notions of individual perspective.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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