In the previous chapter I showed that Kant's theory of freedom implies an asymmetry according to which freedom is prior to nature. On one account, this means that the free self can influence but cannot be influenced by the empirical world. To interpret in another way, one might say that the empirical perspective on the self cannot play a fundamental role within the practical perspective, whereas the practical perspective is necessary in order to complete the empirical one. Whichever interpretation one prefers, one would not expect to find Kant outlining empirical helps and hindrances to moral progress. Such empirical influences on morality represent a reversal of the required asymmetry. However, throughout Kant's mature moral philosophy, one finds references to apparent influences on morality that seem to be empirical. Among the helps and hindrances to which Kant refers are beliefs such as the practical postulates (5:122–35, 452–3, 472), belief in grace (6:44–78), and even belief that virtue is rewarded in one's life (6:216, 474); feelings such as sympathy (6:457), respect (5:71–89, 4:400, 6:39), and love (6:399, 8:337–8); social institutions such as polite society (6:473–4, 7: 151f., 25:502–5, 1455), a peaceful republic (8:375), and churches (6:93–202); the beautiful or sublime (5:268–9, 299, 354–6); and moral education (5:151f., 6:474f., 9:480– 99). A great deal could be said about each of these influences. Some are more clearly empirical than others are. Some are more clearly influences on morality than others are. All of them potentially raise problems for Kant's theory of freedom.

The problem outlined in the Introduction, and my eventual solution, applies to most of the helps and hindrances discussed in Kant's moral philosophy. But the explicit focus of my attention is the way in which Kant's anthropology presents empirical helps and hindrances to having a good will. In this chapter and the next, I show the extent to which Kant's anthropology satisfies the description of anthropology that Schleiermacher criticizes. That is, Kant's anthropology is at once empirical and morally relevant. In this chapter, I show that anthropology is empirical. In the next, I show that it is morally relevant.