This book set out to explore the when, why, and how governments extend benefit access to those without coverage. In particular, we have attempted to uncover the determinants driving governments to extend benefits to erstwhile outsiders – which in some instances has even entailed the standardisation of benefit levels.

This discussion has included a particular focus on leftist organisations, since coverage gaps in the age of austerity pose particularly difficult dilemmas for them. On the one hand, the broad leftist commitment to egalitarianism would suggest that this issue should be of considerable concern to left-wing parties and unions; pursuing the matter would contribute to both ideological consistency and a reaching out to labour market and welfare state outsiders. At the same time, however, fiscal and political constraints on welfare state scope and spending mean that any levelling of access and benefit generosity would almost certainly entail levelling down. It would therefore destroy many of the traditional privileges enjoyed by a variety of occupational groups – groups that often constitute a sizeable portion of the left's support base. What is more, the issue is often further complicated by organisational interests in maintaining certain social insurance institutions, with the goal of preserving sources of power and influence.

In light of the relevance of this issue in today's Europe, we have attempted to shed light on the ways this dilemma has played out vis-à-vis welfare state reform. A comparison of French and Italian reforms in the fields of benefits for the unemployed and healthcare provided the bulk of our framework for understanding the relationship of the left to benefit extension and standardisation. Given that there is no consistent attitude across either leftist parties or unions towards these types of reforms, the introduction laid out a number of general scenarios that might describe patterns of variation:

Scenario 1: The left may opt to maintain the backing of traditional (insider) supporters with pro-status quo preferences, leading partisanship to have a limited impact on the relevant party preferences. This decision may be based, for example, on the perceived feasibility of poaching more votes than might be lost by pursuing reform.

Scenario 2: The left may seek the support of outsiders where possible, but their preferences across countries may differ (being sometimes pro-reform, sometimes pro-status quo), with outcomes in line with those preferences.