No matter how we interpret the conclusion to Socrates' Meno argument, it implies that desiring something bad is tantamount to desiring to be harmed, which is desiring to be miserable and unhappy. This carries two further implications: first, harm is always harm to the self and benefit is always benefit to the self. Second, bad is simply this harm to the self and good is just this benefit to the self.

Socrates seems to neglect a whole category of examples when he equates bad with harm and good with benefit. What of a person who benefits from performing a bad action, where “bad” is here understood as something like “morally wrong?” Socrates' controversial conclusion to the Meno argument and its entailments call our attention to many passages throughout the Socratic dialogues that make it apparent that Socrates is an egoist.

In the Gorgias, we saw Socrates base an entire argument about who has power on the assumption that power – if it is a worthwhile commodity – is good for its possessor (33n.16). Later in the Gorgias, Socrates argues that justice benefits the self (474c4–d2, 475b3–d6), and that it is to be prized because it is better for the agent than the alternative (470e4–11).

In Chapters 4 and 9, we will see that, in the Protagoras, Socrates describes all deliberation concerning voluntary action as a cost/benefit analysis concerning which alternative will bring about the most pleasure for the agent over the long run.