This work seeks to further comprehension of the nature of social life. Why, then, begin with an analysis of mind/action? Since action is generally recognized to be a – if not the – central category in social ontology, every social theory operates with an understanding or explicit account of it and its “determination.” What's more, the conceptions of determination figuring in these accounts invariably embody an interpretation of the mental. Even in the absence of an explicit theory of mentality, the very use of such concepts as goal, belief, emotion, desire, motivation, reason, scheme, expectation, disposition, habit, need, and consciousness evinces at least an implicit understanding of it. Of course, there are divergent interpretations of these concepts and assorted theories to inform their use. The multitude of conceptions of the mental operative in ontological thought is revealed by widespread disagreement over which subset of concepts represents the psychological context of behavior best.

It is not the want of social theorists to dwell on and fashion reflectively the understandings of mind/action on which their accounts of sociality rest. They instead typically import concepts and understandings from psychology (e.g., behaviorism and psychoanalysis) or, more frequently, everyday life. Everyday life traffic with common locutions for mentality and activity harbors an extensive repertoire of concepts and understandings of psychological conditions. More concerned with sociality than with mentality per se, social theorists smoothly draw on the concepts and understandings they acquired in mastering a language and growing up in a culture.