The previous chapter argued that mind/action is socially instituted and the body expressing it socially produced. It is within the context of the reactions, attributions, teachings, and corrections of others that a person comes coordinately to express and be in life conditions, to ascribe them to herself, and to grasp them in others. I glossed this position by claiming that these matters come to pass through participation in social practices. Yet I said nothing about practices. The account of social constitution, consequently, remains incomplete. The current chapter rectifies this situation, while also providing basic elements of the account of sociality developed in Chapter 6.

Wittgenstein wrote almost nothing directly concerning the nature of social practices. I still want, however, to claim the appellation “Wittgensteinian” for my analysis. It approaches the topic of practice using the preceding Wittgensteinian account of mind/action and its social constitution as a platform and occasionally touches on specific statements and views of his. At the same time, it largely leaves Wittgenstein's remarks behind. Thus in contrast to the previous analysis of mind/action, which claims the label “Wittgensteinian” qua systemizing interpretation of his late writings, the impending account of practice claims this label only qua analysis partly based on and inspired by his remarks.

By tackling an issue, the nature of social practices, that is not a prime topic of the remarks from which it takes its orientation, my account enters terrain already explored by the stream of contemporary thought called “practice theory.”