Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction: societal constitutionalism as critical theory
- Section I Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism
- Section II Origins of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations: retracing steps taken by Habermas, Fuller, and Parsons
- Section III Implications of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations
- Chapter 9 Procedural institutionalization beyond the Western democracies: three bases of voluntaristic restraint
- Chapter 10 External restraints: prospects for reason and “tradition”
- Chapter 11 Collegial formations as external procedural restraints: prospects for a public realm
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- Other books in the series
Chapter 10 - External restraints: prospects for reason and “tradition”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction: societal constitutionalism as critical theory
- Section I Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism
- Section II Origins of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations: retracing steps taken by Habermas, Fuller, and Parsons
- Section III Implications of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations
- Chapter 9 Procedural institutionalization beyond the Western democracies: three bases of voluntaristic restraint
- Chapter 10 External restraints: prospects for reason and “tradition”
- Chapter 11 Collegial formations as external procedural restraints: prospects for a public realm
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- Other books in the series
Summary
Why Parsons and Weber distorted restraints
Abandonment of reason
Like the social theorists whose works he helped elevate to the status of classics, Parsons assumed that when social scientists (or actors) describe a social action as “reasoned,” rather than as rational and either instrumental or strategic, this is at best normative and at worst ideological (see also Stinchcombe 1986, even as he endeavors to distinguish reason from rationality). For Parsons and the classics alike, the concept of rational action is generalizable. It can credibly claim grounding against actors' subjective interests and normative relativism, as well as against the relativism of researchers' own value commitments. By contrast, the concept of reasoned social action cannot. As a result, there is no “Archimedean point” available to the social sciences other than the narrow norm of rational action.
By labeling the concept of reasoned social action normative, however, social theorists leave social scientists with an enormous problem. Every researcher's description of social events ultimately contains, among other things, the researcher's attribution of subjective interests to actors and the researcher's own value commitments. As a result, the obstacles to recognizing shifts in the direction of social change other than those either toward or away from rationalization are seemingly insuperable. This is why Parsons thought that the “directionality” that social scientists might possibly recognize in common are shifts (a) toward or away from the narrow norm of rational action, or (b) toward or away from realizing social scientists' own shared value-commitments.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Theory of Societal ConstitutionalismFoundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory, pp. 214 - 241Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991