Over the past two chapters, by describing and defending the ideal of autonomy, I have sought to provide constructive support for liberal perfectionism. In prosecuting my case I have done three things. I have defined autonomy as a distinctive character ideal. I have argued that its realization has intrinsic and instrumental value, and I have defended it from those who charge that it is merely one value among others, deserving no privileged position in a sound account of political morality.

I now want to discuss some of the limits to autonomy's value and importance. The reason for doing this is that sometimes a commitment to autonomy is understood to justify anti-perfectionism, and I want to show that this understanding is mistaken. Put more precisely, it is sometimes thought that if autonomy is a valid character ideal, then the best way for the state to promote the flourishing of its members is for it to refrain from using its power to promote good pursuits and discourage bad ones. This thought poses a challenge to liberal perfectionism. Very concisely expressed, the challenge consists in turning the “liberal” part of liberal perfectionism against the “perfectionist” part. By focusing on some of the limits to autonomy, I hope to show that the challenge can be met.

With this in mind, this chapter changes direction and addresses the claims of those who have tended not to undervalue, but overestimate, the importance of personal autonomy. The spotlight is put on three popular arguments that claim more for this ideal than it can deliver.