The case I have made here for a general theory of the symbol is, of course, far from closed. Doubtless there will be those who will not be persuaded by it, perhaps because they still believe that no general theory is possible, or because they favour one or another of the alternative approaches, or because they see flaws in the FB theory which I have failed to identify. Whatever objections there may be, however, it seems to me that they would need to be organised along one of two possible lines. The first would be to challenge my claim that only the FB theory meets the criteria for an adequate account of symbolism. Critics would need to demonstrate either that some particular alternative approach does, after all, meet those criteria, and does so more adequately than the FB theory, or that no theory, not even the FB theory, meets them. A second possibility would be to dispute the criteria, showing that a general theory of the symbol is not, after all, bound by the requirements which I have stipulated. Such objections would at least take the debate about symbolism into appropriate and hitherto unexplored territory.