The Discrete Charms of the Organized Bourgeoisie

Previous chapters worked to untangle the often turbulent histories of major business associations in the larger countries of Latin America and pinpoint moments of foundation and transformation. These moments were almost always associated with state actions, either deliberate or unintended, that significantly altered the incentives for big business to engage in collective action. The end result was that for most of the second half of the twentieth century, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia had the strongest business associations and the closest approximation overall to liberal or societal corporatism. The two concluding chapters of Part III shift the focus from the causes of greater organizational capacity in business associations to some of the consequences. This chapter considers the question of whether stronger organizations mattered to economic policy making and performance; the next chapter assesses how they affected democracy. The general argument to be developed across these concluding chapters is that stronger associations in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia made more visible and consistent contributions to economic governance and democratic governability than their institutionally weaker counterparts in Brazil and Argentina.

As signaled in Chapter I, there is considerable disagreement over the question of whether an organized bourgeoisie can be expected to have any charms.