Introduction

Treaties addressing modern weapons aside, there is little that is new in the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Discussions of “new paradigms” in warfare usually illustrate the speaker's unawareness of history – allusions to the treachery of terrorists, for instance.

In the twelth or thirteenth century b.c., in the Trojan War, the Greeks employed the legendary Trojan horse to defeat Troy. In the seventh century, the Islamic Caliph Abu Bakr ordered his forces, “Let there be no perfidy, no falsehood in treaties with the enemy, be faithful to all things, proving yourselves upright and noble and maintaining your word and promises truly.” The Lieber Code holds that, “Military necessity…admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy…,” yet perfidy persists.

In 1882, near El Obeid Egypt, the Egyptian government had grown weary of Muhammad Ahmad, a young Muslim who proclaimed himself the Mahdi, the Awaited One. Ahmad initiated a surprisingly effective rebellion against the government, and Cairo finally sent an army to capture or kill the Mahdi. The force was led by a retired British Indian army officer, General William Hicks. “To Cairo's horrified astonishment, Hicks and most of his force was slaughtered at Shaykan…The Mahdi's sharpshooters had feigned retreat, luring inward Hick's army of 7,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 5,000 camels, together with its precious cannons and a horde of camp followers.”

Does LOAC/IHL allow an armed force to “feign retreat” and then kill the pursuing enemy?