The discussion of perceptual judgements in Chapter 6 was launched by the nominalist's objection that, on Peirce's view, the laws implied by symbols are unverifiable, given that their testable consequences outstrip the evidence available to inquirers to confirm them. If this is the case, the nominalist is in a strong position to argue that, even if symbols cannot be altogether eliminated from rational inquiry, they should be viewed as nothing more than tools that enable inquirers to predict and control experience, and not as objective representations of laws operative in the world, as Peirce takes them to be. Having explained how Peirce thinks experience gives rise to symbolic representations (in the form of perceptual judgements) I turn, in this chapter, to his theory of inquiry – his account of the methods by which the truth or falsehood of symbols is determined.

PEIRCE'S VIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Peirce's theory of inquiry is aimed at providing a method that will guide inquirers to truth, no matter what beliefs they start out with. This conception of what rational inquiry requires by way of a method is based on the account of symbols and perceptual judgements given in earlier chapters.

Peirce views inquiry as the pursuit of truth. Truth, for him, is primarily a property of symbols and derivatively of beliefs, the latter being judgements concerning the truth of symbols.