Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- References to Kant's Works
- Introduction
- 1 The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism
- 2 Formalism and the Circle of Representation
- 3 Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience
- 4 The Deep Structure of Synthesis
- 5 The Completion of the Subjective Deduction in the Deductions of the Critique of Judgement
- 6 A Priori Knowledge as the Anticipation of a Material Given and the Need for a Spatial Schematism
- 7 Empirical Systematicity and its Relation to Aesthetic Judgement
- 8 Aesthetic Judgement's Exemplary Exhibition of Cognition
- Afterword
- Bibliography
- Author/subject index
2 - Formalism and the Circle of Representation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- References to Kant's Works
- Introduction
- 1 The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism
- 2 Formalism and the Circle of Representation
- 3 Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience
- 4 The Deep Structure of Synthesis
- 5 The Completion of the Subjective Deduction in the Deductions of the Critique of Judgement
- 6 A Priori Knowledge as the Anticipation of a Material Given and the Need for a Spatial Schematism
- 7 Empirical Systematicity and its Relation to Aesthetic Judgement
- 8 Aesthetic Judgement's Exemplary Exhibition of Cognition
- Afterword
- Bibliography
- Author/subject index
Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to show how formalism is defended by some of Kant's most important recent supporters. Gerd Buchdahl's Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, first published in 1969, set the scene for the riposte to the dominant Strawsonian critique of Kant, published three years previously in 1966. Henry Allison openly acknowledges his debt to Buchdahl, as does Pippin in his less sympathetic interpretation of Kant. Béatrice Longuenesse's direct reference to Buchdahl is restricted to one critical note, but his influence can be indirectly traced through Allison.
While in the accounts offered by Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse we will find more positive accounts of formalism than offered by Kant's critics, I will nevertheless argue that we discover an emphasis on subjective structure at the expense of a convincing account of the relation between subjective form and the material given in experience. Both Buchdahl and Longuenesse, for all the many strengths of their interpretations, risk falling into what I call a circle of representation. Allison has a more convincing account of affection, but still fails to provide a sufficiently robust account of the material side of experience.
Buchdahl's Reductive Formalism
Buchdahl's intricate and forceful interpretation of Kant has not often been given due attention. While his extensive discussion of Kant in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science is regularly cited, it is not so often analysed or assessed. Nevertheless, Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant has been of great importance for Pippin, as we saw in the previous chapter, and also for Allison, whom I will discuss in the following section. Buchdahl’s reading diagnoses a hierarchy of formal frameworks for experience in Kant’s epistemology.
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- Information
- Kant's Aesthetic EpistemologyForm and World, pp. 49 - 85Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2007