In the previous chapter I suggested that aesthetic judgement reveals the synthesis in process necessary to all judgements. In this chapter I argue that synthesis in process is best understood as the subjective side of the deduction, often referred to as ‘the subjective deduction’.

In the first section (pp. 170–6) I discuss Kant's distinction between subjective and objective deductions and insist that these are two sides of the deduction, rather than two separate deductions. The subjective side of the deduction is the cooperation of the faculties, or synthesis, necessary for any judgement. However at this stage of his presentation, Kant is hesitant, although not entirely negative about the significance of the faculties for his epistemology. I suggest that the positive presentation of the subjective deduction is provided in the Critique of Judgement. I take as a clue Kant's statement that all objectively valid judgements are also subjectively valid. I then show how aesthetic judgements – bearers of subjective universality – are not solely a class of judgements set apart, but are internally linked to the structure of judgements already analysed in the first Critique.

In the second section (pp. 177–89) I discuss the claim in Section 21 of the third Critique that aesthetic judgement contributes to a nonsceptical epistemology by uncovering a principle of common sense. I assess the degree to which Kant is successful in avoiding the conclusion that cognition is dependent on aesthetic judgement.