On June 24, 2012, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won the first free Egyptian presidential elections since the end of the Mubarak regime. On July 3 of the following year, he was dismissed from power by the military after a year of unprecedented social unrest and growing popular discontent against his government. His political misfortune captures the contradictory meanings of what has been called the “Arab Spring.”

At first came surprise and enthusiasm for the “democratic” power of the masses that brought down the authoritarian regimes of Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia. Then came doubt and concern when the demise of these powers resulted in the election of Islamist governments in both Egypt and Tunisia.

Steven A. Cook, in his December 19, 2011, piece for Foreign Policy, wrote about the “Frankenstein of Tahrir Square.” The Tahririans, once heralded as revolutionaries with “a cacophony of ideas, projects, initiatives, and manifestos,” later morphed in the public eye into vagabond street protestors with “no moral leadership to give the best of ideas national political meaning and content.” In contrast, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamists, who did not instigate the ousters and laid low during the beginning of the massive protests, are the only ones who played post–Ben Ali and post-Mubarak politics well and surfaced as the elected postrevolutionary leaders.