HOW IT CAME ABOUT

In the eyes of many political observers, Morsi was a well-meaning but inept president, too inexperienced to know how to deal with the country's many problems. Making his job even more difficult, the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide and others in the Guidance Bureau were pulling the strings of power behind the scenes, directing Morsi on any number of issues and often essentially crippling him. And even for a stronger leader who has no such external interference, one year is too short a time to expect significant accomplishments.

Morsi was a member of the Brotherhood's governing body, the Office of Guidance, and was elected as a member of Egypt's Majlis al-Shaab, its lower house of Parliament, in 2005, where he was head of the eighty-seven elected Brotherhood representatives. He carried out the Brotherhood's mandate, which was to gradually help transform Egypt into a theocracy and to support Hamas in Gaza and Brotherhood-related groups in Libya. Egyptians on the whole rejected these goals. But Morsi's parliamentary Bloc proved to be the most disciplined one among all members of Parliament, and they frequently helped shore up the Mubarak regime's legislative program.

Morsi's presidential problems were compounded by a not-so-secret opposition supported or perhaps even instigated by the Military Institution, which, in this case, was thought to have been led by the various intelligence agencies (for example, the General Intelligence Agency, or GIA; Military Intelligence, or MI; the State Security Investigations Service, or SSI). Admittedly, these agencies must have had a relatively easy task, considering all the internal problems that existed within the Brotherhood and the tension between the Office of Guidance and Morsi's staff and cabinet. Discrediting Morsi and his government had to have been fairly easy for these agencies since the targets of their opposition were so ill-equipped to face the challenges confronting them. But Morsi and his regime did come up against genuine problems, which were worsened by their own mismanagement, such as severe water and electrical shortages in the summer and fall of 2012 that extended into early 2013.

These shortages hit people hard. Many Egyptians will tolerate any regime, even an inept one, as long as they can get basic necessities such as water, electricity, gas, and food. Democracy – but not necessities – can be rationed.