In this chapter, I shall examine McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of normative rules that govern, among other things, the meaning of words. Given that McDowell's central project is shedding light on the relation of mind and world, concentrating on rules in this chapter may seem to be heading in a different direction. But Mc-Dowell thinks that what makes the relation of mind and world seem problematic is a deeper dualism between norms and nature. By norms he means normative rules. The deeper dualism is between the kind of intelligibility exemplified in what Sellars calls the “space of reasons”, which is structured by normative rules, and what McDowell calls the “realm of law”. So a proper understanding of rules and their place in nature promises to ease the dualism of mind and world.

There are two other reasons for starting this book with McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It informs the central focus of his own work in two key respects:

• Metaphilosophically, McDowell's account of Wittgenstein serves as a model of his own therapeutic conception of philosophy in general. By contrast with commentators who advance philosophical theses in Wittgenstein's name, McDowell respects Wittgenstein's injunction that philosophy should leave everything as it is. Having diagnosed the misleading assumption that makes normative rules problematic, McDowell is able to remove the apparent need for a philosophical theory.

• Substantially, McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein involves key philosophical ideas, which recur throughout his positive account of mind and world.