In this chapter I shall set out the epistemological consequences of Mc-Dowell's approach to the relation of mind and world, which centres on an account of experience. McDowell defends a form of externalism in epistemology but it is one based on the idea that knowledge depends on reasons. This contrasts with most contemporary forms of externalism – such as reliabilism – that dispense with the notion of reasons altogether in favour of talk of the reliability of belief-forming mechanisms. On the other hand, by advocating a form of externalism, McDowell's account of knowledge differs from most reason-or justification-based accounts. His account is externalism because being justified – having a “standing in the space of reasons” (McDowell 1998a: 395) – is not something a subject can ensure unaided. It depends, as I shall explain, on the world doing the subject a “favour” (ibid.: 405). In the case of perceptual knowledge, the favour is that the world is as appearances suggest it is. But this does not presuppose that appearances intervene between subject and world. Thus McDowell's view contrasts both with positions that emphasize the role of the space of reasons but assume that this is a piece of epistemological internalism, and with most forms of epistemological externalism.

Four main papers characterize McDowell's position: “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge” (1982), “Knowledge by Hearsay” (1993), “Knowledge and the Internal” (1995a) and “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity” (2000d). As will become clear, however, these papers develop the account of experience suggested in “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” (1986), which I discussed in Chapter 4.