Introduction
World politics has always had a plurality of players. The key is not so much to determine which have primacy, but how they interact to produce the prevailing order. This chapter is structured around a discussion of multinational corporations (MNCs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) respectively. Each is discussed in terms of: first, the degree to which it has transnationalised; second, the extent to which it constitutes a social formation able to exert international agency; and third, the degree to which it is able to marshal political influence and status. It is argued that there is no necessary antagonism between state and non-state realms. Instead, relations between state and non-state forces are intermeshed and shaped by broader systemic conflicts. The chapter charts material class antagonisms that shape the role of MNCs and INGOs, and argues that these generate patterns of transnational contestation within international relations.
In the post-Cold War context, globalisation theory made considerable headway. For hyper-globalisationists at least (see Chapter 28), newly powerful transnational forces were overwhelming state and inter-state incumbents. With US power embedded in a range of inter-state frameworks, a model of multilateral unipolarity appeared to be emerging – a model in which US dominance was embedded and restrained by a network of multilateral institutions. More recently, we have seen the advent of a significantly more unilateralist unipolarity, as the United States increasingly has disengaged itself from multilateral institutions by adopting exceptionalist and pre-emptive doctrines. The consequences for globalisation theory have been wide ranging. By the mid-2000s, not only had the hype been exposed as ideology, but the ideology itself was claimed to have been superseded (see McGrew 2007).
The global financial collapse of 2008 exemplified the problem. The crisis was driven by non-state actors (banks and financial institutions), but it was concerted state action that restored the system. Resulting bail-outs and stimulus packages amounted to a fifth of global GDP, and produced a wave of austerity (Harvard Business Review 2010). By 2016, advocates of financial globalisation had been widely discredited, and new challengers were gaining government both on the left and right.