Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Psychology

Introduction

The two philosophers of science to be discussed in this chapter, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, were both strongly influenced by Popper’s falsificationism. In the case of Lakatos, this influence was positive and he sought to build upon Popper’s ideas. In particular, he wanted to develop a more sophisticated falsificationist philosophy that maintained the rational core of Popper’s approach while reflecting the actual practice of science and also minimising the risk of falsifying a theory prematurely. Feyerabend, on the other hand, although a one-time student of Popper’s, reacted against the idea that falsificationism captures the essential feature of scientific method. Indeed, as will be seen, he questioned whether there was any single ‘scientific method’ and argued that science sometimes only progresses by breaking methodological rules.

Imre Lakatos

Imre Lakatos (1922–74) saw his task as improving on Popper’s essential insights in order to avoid falling into what he thought of as Kuhn’s irrationalism. Kuhn rejected falsificationism and, in so doing, had, according to Lakatos, replaced rationality with irrationality: “in Kuhn’s view scientific revolution is irrational, a matter for mob psychology” (‘Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes’, p. 178; hereafter referred to as ‘Methodology’). Given that there are no rational criteria for deciding between paradigms, or even comparing them, the switch from one to the other can only come about because of social factors, irrational preference, and faith. But, says Lakatos, Kuhn has rejected, and shown to be wrong, only a naïve and simplistic version of falsificationism. A more sophisticated falsificationism may avoid succumbing to irrationalism and mob psychology by finding rational grounds for theory change.