Kant: Political Writings

Kant's essay was occasioned by a dispute between Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86), a Jewish philosopher of Berlin with whom Kant corresponded and whom he esteemed greatly, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), a writer and friend of Goethe's who had attacked Mendelssohn's interpretation of Spinoza. It was a bitter dispute because Jacobi had, in Mendelssohn's view, maligned the reputation of their late common friend, the writer and dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729—81) when he claimed that Lessing had been a follower of Spinoza and hence a pantheist who did not believe in a personal God. Mendelssohn rebutted this charge and maintained that Jacobi had misunderstood Lessing. Their argument is of historical interest only.

Kant's essay, however, provides an introduction to his critical philosophy and shows how his discussion of the theoretical use of reason, as argued in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Can Claim the Status of a Science ﹛Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können) (1783), necessarily leads on to the practical use of reason as defined in his writings on ethics (for instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) (1785)), which in turn provide the foundation of his political writing. Kant did not openly attack either of the two writings in question, but thought it necessary to defend his late friend Mendelssohn while at the same time pointing out some shortcomings in Mendelssohn's argument (Mendelssohn had put forward proofs for the existence of God which Kant held to be illegitimate). He proceeds to show that the belief in reason is a ‘signpost or compass'1 which enables us to orientate our thinking. The use of reason is necessary in order to limit our enquiries to what can, in principle, be discovered and to prevent us from seeking to discover what is beyond the boundaries of knowledge. But the right use of reason also makes it possible for us to act morally. We have to avoid falling victim to zealotry or superstition—that would even be politically dangerous, for it would sooner or later lead to political repression by the authorities who would not be willing to tolerate the spreading of foolish and subversive opinions.