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Chapter 5: On the impulsive cause of constituting the state

Chapter 5: On the impulsive cause of constituting the state

pp. 132-134

Authors

Edited by , McGill University, Montréal
Translated by , McGill University, Montréal
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Summary

1. There seems to be hardly any amenity or advantage that cannot be secured by the duties and conditions [status] we have so far discussed. Nevertheless we must now investigate why men have not been content with those first small associations [societas], but have constituted large associations which go by the name of states [civitas]. For this is the basis from which we must derive the justification of the duties which go with men's civil State [status civilis].

2. It is not enough to say here that man is drawn to civil society [societas civilis] by nature herseif, so that he cannot and will not live without it. For man is obviously an animal that loves himself and his own advantage in the highest degree. It is undoubtedly therefore necessary that in freely aspiring to civil society he has his eye on some advantage coming to himself from it. Again, man was likely to be the most miserable of animals without association [societas] with his fellows; yet his natural desires and needs could have been abundantly met by the earliest societies and by duties based on humanity or agreements. We cannot therefore infer directly from man's sociality [socialitas] that his nature tends precisely to civil society.

3. This will become clearer if we consider: (1) the human condition which results from the constitution of states; (2) the requirements for a man to be truly said to be a political animal, i.e., a good Citizen; and finally, (3) the observed features of human nature which are repugnant to the character of civil society.

4. (1) In becoming a Citizen, a man loses his natural liberty and subjects himself to an authority whose powers include the right of life and death. At its command he must do much he would otherwise avoid; and he must not do much that he would otherwise powerfully desire to do. Again, in most of his actions he must take into account the good of society, which often seems to conflict with the good of individuals. Yet he has a congenital tendency to want to be subject to no one, to act at his own discretion, and to set his course for his own advantage in everything.

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