Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Anti-Base Movements and the Security Consensus Framework
- 2 Under a Weak Security Consensus
- 3 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Anti-Base Movements in Okinawa, 1995–1996
- 4 Anti-Base Movements in Ecuador and Italy
- 5 South Korean Anti-Base Movements and the Resilience of the Security Consensus
- 6 Alliance Relations and the Security Consensus Across Time
- 7 Activists, Alliances, and the Future of U.S. Basing Strategy
- Appendix: Selected List of Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Alliance Relations and the Security Consensus Across Time
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Anti-Base Movements and the Security Consensus Framework
- 2 Under a Weak Security Consensus
- 3 The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Anti-Base Movements in Okinawa, 1995–1996
- 4 Anti-Base Movements in Ecuador and Italy
- 5 South Korean Anti-Base Movements and the Resilience of the Security Consensus
- 6 Alliance Relations and the Security Consensus Across Time
- 7 Activists, Alliances, and the Future of U.S. Basing Strategy
- Appendix: Selected List of Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The previous chapters demonstrated how the degree of security consensus influenced basing policy outcomes by shaping the patterns of interaction between the host government, anti-base movements, and the United States. By process-tracing events in a single movement episode, the case examples provided a snapshot of anti-base movements in the Philippines, Japan, Italy, Ecuador, and South Korea. However, as snapshots in time, the security consensus assumed a fixed quality.
If the security consensus were to strengthen or weaken over time, would we expect variations in anti-base movement outcomes? For instance, how would increasing security ties between the Philippines and the United States in their fight against terrorism impact protests against the U.S. military presence in the southern Philippines? What if commonly shared beliefs about the U.S. alliance among South Korean political elites dissolved, with key elites advocating closer alignment with China? What if Japanese leaders decided to pursue a more independent security policy, resulting in an erosion of a previously strong security consensus? Based on the security consensus framework, activists should find it much more difficult to influence base policy outcomes if key elites coalesce more tightly around a security policy centered on the United States. Conversely, anti-base movements are more likely to have an impact on policy as the security consensus weakens.
Expanding the analysis to compare anti-base movement episodes across different time periods is important on two accounts. First, it allows us to test the robustness of the theory by adding within-country case comparisons.
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- Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests , pp. 149 - 177Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011