The Twilight of the British Empire Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
5 - Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
Summary
CENTO was a disappointment to the regional members, all of them … We [US and Britain] took a, very, I’d say, fairly rigid line, that the CENTO organization was intended to deal with a communist threat, and basically a Soviet Communist threat obviously. Whereas Iran would have liked us very much in public statements, the communiques, or actual activities to use the organization against Iraq [after Iraq had left] … The Pakistanis wanted us to use the organisation against India in some fashion or other.
Charles NaasOur main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian members [i.e. the regional members] would tend to interpret countersubversion as simply an excuse to discuss and develop operations by their own police and security services … [comprising] Generals and Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, and no one even remotely connected with information work as we know it.
Sir Leonard FiggIntroduction
According to historian Daniel Pipes, Middle Eastern leaders had a ‘conspiracy mentality’ when interpreting regional affairs. This was compounded by threats of internal subversion, often fanned by propaganda. Accordingly, many Middle Eastern leaders believed that anti-governmental activities were all instigated and propagated by external enemies. As we have seen, regional security services held diverging views on internal security from their British counterparts. This rift was most noticeable during discussions of the Counter-Subversion Committee and most destructive in anti-Communist propaganda.
This chapter explores the nature of the threats that Middle Eastern governments encountered; how Britain and the local authorities used propaganda as an anti-Communist measure under the Baghdad Pact; and the extent to which local authorities understood and conducted anti-Communist measures in their countries. It shows that although all members considered Communist movements the main threat, limitations in the Pact's collective efforts existed. These mainly stemmed from its dynamics: while Britain and the United States considered the Pact as an alliance against the Soviet Union or International Communism, the regional members were more concerned about local or regional problems.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Twilight of the British EmpireBritish Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63, pp. 114 - 145Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017