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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
1 - Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
Summary
The term ‘counter-subversion’ is used in this paper to mean clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or by operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism.
Prime Minister's Memorandum, 10 December 1955The principal object of our Middle East policy has recently been stated by Ministers to be the security of the oil on which the United Kingdom so greatly depends. The main instrument by which we hope to achieve our policy is the Baghdad Pact. Its value to the United Kingdom is primarily as a means of improving the Western position in the cold war and retaining the goodwill of two of the oil producing countries, namely, Iran and Iraq.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 July 1956Introduction
The British government was greatly concerned by subversive activities. In 1958, for example, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) viewed ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout the world’ as the highest priority intelligence targets, alongside a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union against Great Britain. This chapter looks at the development of Britain's post-war overseas anti-Communist policy and the organisational structures that shaped it. Since anti-Communist, or counter-subversion, policy in the Middle East developed in parallel with other foreign and colonial territories, this chapter starts with the origins of Britain's post-war anti-Communist policy overseas in the late 1940s. It shows that Whitehall departmental infighting over waging Cold War included stark disagreement about the role, conduct and severity of anti-Communist measures. The chapter then outlines the mechanisms of counter-subversion in the Middle East and discusses Britain's relationship with the United States in anti-Communist measures in the region.
The Origins of Post-War Counter-Subversive Activities Overseas
The origins of Britain's counter-subversive activities overseas can be traced back to the late 1940s. The first post-war British government envisaged a potential war against the Soviet Union and adopted a very strong anti-Communist policy to fight the ‘Communist menace’ overseas. Britain's first post-war Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, decided to establish three bodies within the Foreign Office directing anti-Communist activities in order to fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union: one committee and two departments.
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- The Twilight of the British EmpireBritish Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63, pp. 10 - 30Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017