Introduction

Webs of intelligence networks existed at different levels all across the Middle East. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the British cooperated with local security services, trained local officers, and implemented security measures against Communists through local security forces. These arrangements were not systematic and thus were made on an ad hoc basis. At the same time, local authorities also cooperated with each other at various levels. These intelligence networks at local initiatives were also sporadic and operated on an ad hoc and personal basis between officers at a senior level. As noted in Chapter 1, the British considered a regional Cold War defence treaty, the Baghdad Pact, later renamed CENTO, as the best means to preserve their foreign and defence interests in the region, as well as to counter Communist movements. They also attempted to institutionalise intelligence cooperation, but were plagued by difficulties from the outset. As the above quotations indicate, the British found certain characteristics of Middle Eastern intelligence and security practices incompatible with their own approaches.

This chapter explores the nature of the intelligence/security liaison between Britain and Middle Eastern states, including both necessary preconditions and obstacles. The intelligence liaison in the region had two dimensions. Firstly, since any form of cooperation required a secure organisation, the British strove to improve the security of systems before actual intelligence cooperation began.