The retention of the British Empire was, in the words of esteemed diplomat, Lord Franks, ‘part of the habit and furniture of the minds’. When it looked to be under threat, policymakers expected the intelligence services to intervene and protect Britain's interests. This worked effectively in many colonies where decolonisation involved a relatively smooth and successful transition to Commonwealth, thereby allowing law enforcement bodies to play an important role in safeguarding British influence. It was more difficult in the Middle East where policymakers also expected intelligence to maintain British interests in an altogether difference context, this time by working with local authorities to promote anti-Communist measures. MI5 and colonial police officers were deployed in the region and expected to perform the same tasks as they had in the colonies. Similarly, policymakers hoped that British training, again transposed from the imperial context, of strong Middle Eastern security services would also safeguard their regional interests.

It was often Middle Eastern governments that took the initiative in requesting British advice on anti-Communist measures, but Britain gladly agreed and provided assistance as a means of influencing policy. At the time, Middle Eastern governments saw Britain as their most reliable ally in fighting subversive elements at home. This was mostly due to its reputation for organisational reliability, as well as personal relationships developed through Britain's involvement in the region over many years.