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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
Summary
Those who consider it [Britain's engagement in the post-war Middle East] to have been a period of failure are the sentimentalists who do not understand why things should not have gone on as they were before. A more correct judgement is that though we made mistakes like everyone else involved, we have so far come through an unusually difficult and complex period without more damage to our real interests in the Middle East.
Lord TrevelyanIt is just possible, I suppose, that the West knows how a country like Persia ought to be governed in the best interests of the people, but that it knows how it could be so governed has always seemed to me very unlikely.
Lt.-Col. Geoffrey WheelerThe retention of the British Empire was, in the words of esteemed diplomat, Lord Franks, ‘part of the habit and furniture of the minds’. When it looked to be under threat, policymakers expected the intelligence services to intervene and protect Britain's interests. This worked effectively in many colonies where decolonisation involved a relatively smooth and successful transition to Commonwealth, thereby allowing law enforcement bodies to play an important role in safeguarding British influence. It was more difficult in the Middle East where policymakers also expected intelligence to maintain British interests in an altogether difference context, this time by working with local authorities to promote anti-Communist measures. MI5 and colonial police officers were deployed in the region and expected to perform the same tasks as they had in the colonies. Similarly, policymakers hoped that British training, again transposed from the imperial context, of strong Middle Eastern security services would also safeguard their regional interests.
It was often Middle Eastern governments that took the initiative in requesting British advice on anti-Communist measures, but Britain gladly agreed and provided assistance as a means of influencing policy. At the time, Middle Eastern governments saw Britain as their most reliable ally in fighting subversive elements at home. This was mostly due to its reputation for organisational reliability, as well as personal relationships developed through Britain's involvement in the region over many years.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Twilight of the British EmpireBritish Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63, pp. 170 - 177Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017