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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
4 - Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Two-Part Tribute Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas
- 2 Security Training and Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures
- 3 The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East
- 4 Prerequisites of Intelligence Cooperation
- 5 Conflicting Interests in Anti-Communist Measures
- 6 The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence
- Conclusion: The Twilight of the British Empire in the Middle East
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Appendix: Security Intelligence Middle East Charter
- Index
Summary
The three CENTO Regional countries are governed by dictatorships … Their Intelligence Services have no continuing tradition of semiindependent non-political action … The senior officers depend for their appointments and for funds on their ability to keep in favour of a very small ruling minority. They are thus intensely involved in politics, both internal and foreign … This is a disadvantage; but it cannot be helped.
Alex KellarIn my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious and are probably well able to take care of their own secrets; but the protection of common secrets is another matter. Here the slothfulness, venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, as well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all hazards along the road to good security.
Roger LeesIntroduction
Webs of intelligence networks existed at different levels all across the Middle East. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the British cooperated with local security services, trained local officers, and implemented security measures against Communists through local security forces. These arrangements were not systematic and thus were made on an ad hoc basis. At the same time, local authorities also cooperated with each other at various levels. These intelligence networks at local initiatives were also sporadic and operated on an ad hoc and personal basis between officers at a senior level. As noted in Chapter 1, the British considered a regional Cold War defence treaty, the Baghdad Pact, later renamed CENTO, as the best means to preserve their foreign and defence interests in the region, as well as to counter Communist movements. They also attempted to institutionalise intelligence cooperation, but were plagued by difficulties from the outset. As the above quotations indicate, the British found certain characteristics of Middle Eastern intelligence and security practices incompatible with their own approaches.
This chapter explores the nature of the intelligence/security liaison between Britain and Middle Eastern states, including both necessary preconditions and obstacles. The intelligence liaison in the region had two dimensions. Firstly, since any form of cooperation required a secure organisation, the British strove to improve the security of systems before actual intelligence cooperation began.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Twilight of the British EmpireBritish Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63, pp. 88 - 113Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017