THE successful and secret withdrawal of the Gaza garrison spoilt Allenby's plans for the total destruction of the Turkish army there. It was now not possible to trap the garrison inside the city: the Turks would be able to fight on somewhere else in Palestine. The basic reason for the Turks’ success had been the resistance of the Turkish 19th Division at Tell el-Khuweilfe. This had been intended to block any British movement along the Hebron road, but it had also had the effect of deflecting the main British advance. The breakthrough at Tell esh-Sheria led to an exploitation towards the coast, whereas the original intention had been to strike for the coast from 10 miles further north, from Tell en-Nejile. It was the necessary concentration of the Welsh Division, the Camel Brigade, the Yeomanry Mounted Division, and the New Zealanders against the 19th Division which compelled that diversion. By striking for the coast from Tell esh-Sheria, the British forces were unable to attack the Turkish troops who were retreating northwards. From Tell en-Nejile it would have been more likely to succeed in cutting their retreat. As it was, the Turks lived to fight again, several times.

It also changed the nature of the next fortnight's operations. The intention had been to cut across behind the Turks and so encircle most of their forces. But their escape northwards meant that the operation had now become a pursuit, with the British straining to catch up with the fast-retreating Turks, and the Turks attempting at first just to get away and then to establish a defensible position at which they could block any further British advance. It was also a logistical problem, for the Turks were falling back on their supplies, whereas the British were moving away from theirs. The eventual result had to be another stalemate, with the Turks recovering and the British exhausted. It was another severe test of Allenby's generalship.

Allenby ordered a pursuit through the breaks in the Turkish line at Gaza and Tell esh-Sheria and at the same time ordered those gaps to be widened. Falkenhayn and von Kressenstein, on the other hand, ordered active rearguards into operation, though this proved very difficult to organize.