Although the laws do not punish intentions, surely an action which shows a clear intent to commit a crime deserves to be punished, albeit less harshly than the actual execution of the crime would be. The necessity of preventing an attempt at crime justifies a punishment; but since the attempt and the carrying out of the crime may be separated by an interval, the heavier penalties for an accomplished crime might lead to a change of heart. The same may be said, although on different grounds, of a case in which there are accomplices in a crime, not all of whom are its main agents. When several men join together in a risky venture, the greater the risk, the more they try to share it equally among all of them. It will therefore be hard to find an individual prepared to be the main agent and to run a greater risk than his accomplices. The sole exception would be when the main agent is promised a special recompense. Since he would have been compensated for the greater risk he runs, in this case the penalty should be the same for all of them. Such considerations might seem too metaphysical to someone who does not recognise that it is of the greatest utility to have laws which elicit the fewest possible grounds for agreement among the participants in a crime.