But should someone who is banished and excluded forever from the society of which he was a member be deprived of his possessions? This question can be considered from various points of view. The loss of one's goods is a greater punishment than that of banishment; so there ought to be some cases in which, proportionately with the crime, there ought to be partial or total loss of possessions or none at all. All possessions shall be forfeit when the banishment laid down by law is such as to sever all the ties between society and the malefactor. In such a case, the citizen dies and the man remains, and as far as the body politic is concerned, this should have the same effect as natural death. It would therefore seem that the convict's goods should pass to his legitimate heirs rather than to the prince, since death and banishment are identical in the eyes of the body politic. But it is not on account of this subtlety that I dare to oppose the confiscation of goods. If some writers have upheld the view that confiscations have put a brake on vendettas and private bullying, they have not observed that a punishment is just not simply because it produces some good, but because it is necessary.