The first consequence of these principles is that laws alone can decree punishments for crimes, and that this authority resides only with the legislator, who represents the whole of society united by the social contract. No magistrate (who is a member of society) can justly establish of his own accord any punishment for any member of the same society. A punishment which exceeds the limit laid down by law is the just punishment with another punishment superadded. Therefore, a magistrate may not, on any pretext of zeal or concern for the public good whatsoever, increase the punishment laid down by law for a miscreant citizen.

The second consequence is that whilst every individual is bound to society, society is likewise bound to every individual member of it by a pact which, by its very nature, places obligations on both parties. {These obligations, which descend from the palace to the hovel, bind equally the most elevated and the humblest of men, mean nothing other than that it is in the interests of all that the pacts useful to the greatest number be observed. Violation by even one man begins to legitimate anarchy.} The sovereign, as the representative of society, may only frame laws in general terms which are binding on all members. He may not rule on whether an individual has violated the social pact, because that would divide the nation into two parts: one, represented by the sovereign, who asserts the violation of the contract, and the other, represented by the accused, who denies it.