Rationality and trust

We have, in the foregoing chapter, suggested one reason why moral motivations might play a disproportionately significant role in democratic politics: the mechanics of democratic elections may engage expressive rather than instrumental concerns, and the expressive calculus is more likely to promote moral action. In short, the veil of insignificance reduces the price of moral action in the political arena relative to the market arena, so that we would expect more moral action in politics. We now want to turn to a different line of argument, which has the same general ambition – namely to suggest that moral motivations may be especially relevant in the setting of democratic politics. This line of argument stems from the idea that rationality might require departures from egoism: that homo economicus is self-defeating in a range of circumstances of relevance – and self-defeating in a way that is hospitable to certain accounts of morality. We will present our argument in three steps.