Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I THE THEORY OF POLITICAL FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY: SLAVERY, MUTUAL REGARD, AND MODERN EGALITARIANISM
- 1 A common good and justice in war
- 2 The capacity for moral personality and the ambiguities of liberalism
- 3 Empiricism, neo-Kantianism, and realism in science and ethics
- 4 Neo-Kantianism and moral realism
- PART II DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY
- Conclusion: the project of democratic individuality
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Empiricism, neo-Kantianism, and realism in science and ethics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I THE THEORY OF POLITICAL FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY: SLAVERY, MUTUAL REGARD, AND MODERN EGALITARIANISM
- 1 A common good and justice in war
- 2 The capacity for moral personality and the ambiguities of liberalism
- 3 Empiricism, neo-Kantianism, and realism in science and ethics
- 4 Neo-Kantianism and moral realism
- PART II DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY
- Conclusion: the project of democratic individuality
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In political and social science as well as philosophy, affirmations of metaethical conventionalism often stem from broad philosophical arguments about what exists and the nature of our knowledge. Political theorists frequently marshal sweeping skeptical arguments that have no special bearing on ethics as if they licensed a restricted moral relativism. Worse yet, these broad arguments are often taken for granted or not fully stated; for lack of investigation and articulation, they haunt particular, implausible claims. A specification of these ontological and epistemological debates will help us to separate general skeptical contentions from specific criticisms of moral objectivity. It will also enable the reader to see that the case for ethical objectivity fits in with powerful recent epistemological arguments, ones not easy to dismiss. If successful, the example of a worked-out moral realism will contribute to the broader case for epistemological realism. Furthermore, it will allow us to assess the clash between radical and liberal claims about democratic individuality in a new context. For these reasons, this book defends a highly articulated version of moral realism.
Given the dismal current state of these debates in ethics and political theory, however, this project will require some fleshing out of neglected patterns of philosophical argument. Unfortunately, many contemporary philosophers have regarded ethics as a less interesting, secondary discipline.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Democratic Individuality , pp. 108 - 148Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990