In political and social science as well as philosophy, affirmations of metaethical conventionalism often stem from broad philosophical arguments about what exists and the nature of our knowledge. Political theorists frequently marshal sweeping skeptical arguments that have no special bearing on ethics as if they licensed a restricted moral relativism. Worse yet, these broad arguments are often taken for granted or not fully stated; for lack of investigation and articulation, they haunt particular, implausible claims. A specification of these ontological and epistemological debates will help us to separate general skeptical contentions from specific criticisms of moral objectivity. It will also enable the reader to see that the case for ethical objectivity fits in with powerful recent epistemological arguments, ones not easy to dismiss. If successful, the example of a worked-out moral realism will contribute to the broader case for epistemological realism. Furthermore, it will allow us to assess the clash between radical and liberal claims about democratic individuality in a new context. For these reasons, this book defends a highly articulated version of moral realism.

Given the dismal current state of these debates in ethics and political theory, however, this project will require some fleshing out of neglected patterns of philosophical argument. Unfortunately, many contemporary philosophers have regarded ethics as a less interesting, secondary discipline.