Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Wittgenstein on philosophy, normativity and understanding
- 2 Value judgements
- 3 Formal theories of meaning and theories of sense
- 4 Singular thought and the Cartesian picture of mind
- 5 Experience, knowledge and openness to the world
- 6 Mind and World and idealism
- Glossary
- Guide to further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Formal theories of meaning and theories of sense
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Wittgenstein on philosophy, normativity and understanding
- 2 Value judgements
- 3 Formal theories of meaning and theories of sense
- 4 Singular thought and the Cartesian picture of mind
- 5 Experience, knowledge and openness to the world
- 6 Mind and World and idealism
- Glossary
- Guide to further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I shall describe the background to, and the main themes of, McDowell's investigation of a Davidsonian “truth theory” of meaning. Such a theory of meaning aims to articulate the structure of natural language by drawing on the logical machinery of Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Its aim, in a sense to be clarified below, is to shed light on the nature of linguistic meaning.
Two major themes will emerge. One is McDowell's thinking that a theory of meaning cannot hope to explain meaning using meaningfree notions. The best approach to a theory of meaning is not to attempt to adopt a perspective outside language to try to explain the connection between language or mind and the world. The best reading of a Davidsonian theory of meaning is modest. It would contribute to our understanding of language mastery in particular, and being minded in general, but only by presupposing linguistic notions, that is, from within that world of meaning:
[A] modest theory of meaning, by design, starts in the midst of content; so it cannot contribute to this task of representing content as an achievement … What is needed is an understanding of how content, explicitly conceived as inaccessible except “from inside”, can be comprehended as a precipitate of simpler modes of activity and awareness than those in which it figures.
(McDowell 1998a: 105)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- John McDowell , pp. 101 - 140Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2004