In the previous chapter I examined the receptive condition of knowledge and its source in sensibility. This faculty is able to take up the object given in experience because of its introduction of intuitive forms into the manifold or empirical matter. I have claimed that there are three conditions for knowledge. First, there must be something given to us; second, we must be receptive to that given; and third, we must be capable of unifying the given under a concept. In the last chapter I discussed the first and second of these conditions. I now turn to the third, the condition of conceptual determination.

Knowledge as opposed to intuition is only possible if we can unify and thus identify what Kant provisionally called the object in the initial paragraphs of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first section of this chapter I discuss the other side of Kant's dualism and argue that it is best understood as reflective form. I also argue that, on closer examination, dualism requires a plural iteration of the operations of the mind as the synthesis of affectivity and conceptualisation requires a third term, imagination. The combination of these different elements of experience counts as synthesis.

In the second section, I discuss the faculty talk that I have employed in my initial characterisation of synthesis. I suggest that the faculties need be seen neither as psychological constructs nor as curious entities. Kant's faculty talk allows for reflection on a complex model of mind in which only the combination of distinct orientations gives rise to the structure or form of experience.