So far the argument of this book has been fairly abstract. In chapters 2–5 I sought to discredit the bracketing strategy by calling into question its distinctive feature, a commitment to the principles of restraint. In chapters 6–8 I then tried to provide support for liberal perfectionism by arguing for the centrality of personal autonomy to human flourishing and by showing that a strong commitment to autonomy is fully compatible with perfectionism. Taken in conjunction, these arguments were intended to show that liberal perfectionism has greater justificatory force than the best account of anti-perfectionist political morality.

This concluding chapter brings the discussion down to earth by considering a range of public policy issues. The issues to be discussed will not be given the type of in-depth treatment they require. But my ambition in this chapter is not to defend conclusively any particular policy judgment. I have two much more modest goals. First, to give some indication of how the perfectionist views defended in this book might differ from anti-perfectionist views at the level of concrete politics. Second, to expose some weaknesses and limits in anti-perfectionist arguments often invoked in public debate over policy issues.

Promoting autonomy

I have argued that personal autonomy warrants a central place in a sound account of political morality. But I have not said anything about how this ideal could be promoted through political action. Personal autonomy is not a tangible resource or a primary good that can be distributed by political authorities.