THE enticements of vulgar relativism are not very tempting. But its central error is quite important; and that it is an error has a significance beyond that particular doctrine, concerned as that is with the relations between societies. It is possible for someone persuaded of subjectivist views to cease to care about moral issues. (This is different from ceasing to regard something as, in itself, a moral issue. Thus it is both possible and reasonable to suppose that there is no distinctively sexual morality, in the sense of moral considerations that govern sexual relationships and nothing else; while admitting the extremely obvious fact that sexual relationships are profoundly and specially liable to give rise to moral issues, of trust, exploitation, unconcern for the interests of third parties and so forth.) A man confronted with some monstrous political injustice, for instance, may feel no confidence in protesting or fighting against it because, as he says, ‘Who's to judge?,’ or ‘It's only my feelings against theirs,’ or something like that.

In so far as there is any traceable intellectual link between the subjectivism and the indifference, it must involve something like the relativist error. For the thought must be something like this: ‘Because subjectivism is true, I am not justified in protesting,’ If this is right, it must be so either because, if subjectivism is true, no one is justified in doing anything; or because, if subjectivism is true, he is specially not justified in protesting.