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Chapter 4 - The causal significance of basic attributes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2010

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Summary

BASIC UNIVERSALS

I have distinguished statements that say “there is” a universal from statements that say a universal occurs. If “there is” a universal, then it is possible that it occur any number of times, or not at all. The central characterization of the notion of universal is in terms of this possibility of multiple occurrence. This notion of occurrence is a primitive, intuitive notion based on a commonsense view of the world, but it is by no means alien to a scientific view of the world. The shape or mass to be found here, instanced by one object, is also to be found there, instanced by a second object. The shape or mass occurs in the sense that it can be “found”.

In order to elucidate the notion of occurrence, or being found, it is natural to turn to causality. If a certain shape occurs, or is found, then we can interact with it in some sense, and it should be regarded as causally significant. If the shape of a body is changed from spherical to ellipsoidal, for example, then the particular concerned will interact causally in a different way. It is likely therefore that causality will be some sort of guide to the ontological status of universals.

There are some predicates that appear to signify universals that are significant for causality, but that are dependent on other universals.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

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