In this chapter I set out to explore the notion of ‘examination’, exetazein, as the central term in Socrates' statement of his philosophical ‘mission’ in the Apology. I shall take as my starting-point the main version of that statement in the Apology, pairing it by way of anticipation with a contrasting passage from the Phaedrus – which will serve as an introduction to the apparently rather different notion of the self, and the soul, that seems to emerge, and with some radical consequences, in the Republic. The Phaedrus will be the topic of the fourth, short section of the chapter (the second will be an equally brief digression on learning as recollection); chapter 5 will then, inter alia, discuss the degree of difference between the conceptions of soul in the pre-Republic dialogues and in the Republic and after. (Chapter 4 will discuss related issues in the – pre-Republic – Gorgias.) The focus throughout will be on what Plato's Socrates understands by self-examination, which I take to contain the key to a proper interpretation of what it means for Socrates to ‘examine’ others.

Here is Socrates' ringing statement of the nature of his life's mission in the Apology