At the end of the book I pose the same two questions I began with and suggest some answers. How did a society with diffuse power structures and few legal corporate entities remain stable despite frequent breakdowns of order? How could a government without the monopoly of force control a large and heterogeneous society over wide territories?

The cohesion of society through periods of turmoil has been attributed to the strength of the groups which made it up: the extended family or tribe, the city quarters, the ulama buttressed by a self-conscious identity and, at a later date, the Sufi ṭarīqas. There can be no doubt that these institutions contributed to social cohesion, but we still need to ask how they did so. Group solidarity itself cannot explain their strength because there was dissension within all communities. Furthermore, most groups overlapped with others with whom their interests could diverge. For the city elite there were several levels of belonging: family and quarter, then profession – as merchant, Sufi shaykh, ʿālim, or bureaucrat. Professional groups themselves overlapped significantly. Sufi shaykhs were also members of the ulama, viziers and members of the ulama might also be part of the army, and a single family might well produce Sufis of different affiliations, ulama, bureaucrats, and even military men.

Politics in Iran at this period were not organized according to profession, ideology, or class, but rather among shifting factions which included members of different groups.