From the British viewpoint, Roosevelt's election did not spell the end of Anglo-American co-operation. MacDonald, Chamberlain, and others looked towards an amicable resolution of war debts once general American opinion understood the distress that continued payments created for the British government. Moreover, despite concern about the World Disarmament Conference after Hitler's appointment as German chancellor, hope existed in some quarters that joint efforts by London and Washington might produce headway in arms limitation. Yet, diplomacy differs little from other human enterprise: a willingness to align cannot come from one side alone. Roosevelt refused to follow the more internationalist path taken by Hoover and Stimson. There were compelling reasons, all stemming from the domestic economic crisis that, in his election campaign, he promised to overcome: widespread bank failures menaced the country's fiscal solvency; with the dollar tied to gold, one-half of American gold reserves had drained away in 1932; a high dollar had savaged American exports; reduced demand for consumer goods at home and abroad saw industrial unemployment reach record highs, with attendant social distress; and farm prices and income had declined 40 per cent from their 1929 value. Thus, Roosevelt and his advisers, especially Rexford Tugwell and Raymond Moley, two Columbia University professors, concluded that the United States should solve its problems before tackling international issues.