Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the text
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Philosophical Investigations §§1–693: an elementary exposition
- Chapter 2 From the Tractatus to the Investigations: two prefaces
- Chapter 3 The opening of the Philosophical Investigations: the motto
- Chapter 4 The critique of referential theories of meaning and the paradox of ostension: §§1–64
- Chapter 5 The critique of rule-based theories of meaning and the paradox of explanation: §§65–133
- Chapter 6 The critique of rule-based theories of meaning and the paradoxes of rule-following: §§134–242
- Chapter 7 The critique of a private language and the paradox of private ostension: §§243–68
- Conclusion
- Recommended further reading
- References
- Index
Chapter 1 - Philosophical Investigations §§1–693: an elementary exposition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the text
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Philosophical Investigations §§1–693: an elementary exposition
- Chapter 2 From the Tractatus to the Investigations: two prefaces
- Chapter 3 The opening of the Philosophical Investigations: the motto
- Chapter 4 The critique of referential theories of meaning and the paradox of ostension: §§1–64
- Chapter 5 The critique of rule-based theories of meaning and the paradox of explanation: §§65–133
- Chapter 6 The critique of rule-based theories of meaning and the paradoxes of rule-following: §§134–242
- Chapter 7 The critique of a private language and the paradox of private ostension: §§243–68
- Conclusion
- Recommended further reading
- References
- Index
Summary
THE ‘METHOD OF §2’
In the Philosophical Investigations, topics are repeatedly introduced in the following way.
Stage 1: A brief statement of a philosophical position that Wittgenstein opposes, which usually emerges out of an exchange with another voice. Thus, in §1, we are presented with a conception of meaning that arises out of Wittgenstein's reading of a passage from Augustine's Confessions:
Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
(§1b)Stage 2: The description of a quite specific set of circumstances in which that position is appropriate:
That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right.
(§2)In §2 of the Philosophical Investigations, the passage just quoted leads in to the famous story of ‘Wittgenstein's builders’, a tribe who only have four words, each of which is used by a builder to instruct his assistant to bring one of four kinds of building blocks.
Stage 3: The deflationary observation that the circumstances in question are quite limited, and that once we move beyond them, the position becomes inappropriate:
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises: ‘Is this an appropriate description or not?’ The answer is: ‘Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe.’
(§3a)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Wittgenstein's Philosophical InvestigationsAn Introduction, pp. 10 - 28Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004