THE ELECTION OF SALVADOR ALLENDE AS PRESIDENT OF CHILE IN 1970 awoke world-wide interest. He obtained executive power at the head of an electoral coalition whose chief members were the Chilean Socialist and Communist Parties and he entered upon his term of oflice dedicated to finding a ‘Chilean Way to Socialism’ that would entail a continuing observance of Chile's well established constitutional traditions.

The peaceful election of a government led by a self-styled ‘Marxist-Leninist’ and containing two strong avowedly Marxist parties was in itself the cause of comment. Still more interest was aroused by the government's declared intention of conducting a revolution within the framework of a ‘liberal-constitutional’ system of government.

SITUATIONS IN WHICH VIOLENCE IS THE RESULT OF THE USE OF massive force in international conflicts is not the primary concern of what follows. It should be kept in mind, however, that war constitutes the outer limit, quantitatively, of political violence. However, internal war, that is organized, large scale armed conflicts between groups within a political system or order, manifesting the breakdown of such an order, is part of our concern. Violence is related to the maintenance of political power, although this sort of violence is more usually spoken of as ‘force.’

ON THE EVE OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITIES, THE problem of the institutions, their functioning and their development assumes particularly great importance.

In the twenty years since the European system was established, it has gone from one crisis to the next, thanks to extraordinary efforts or fits and starts of determination which enabled the difficulties to be overcome at the last moment and the Communities to be put in a position – once again – to respond to the hopes entertained around them.

This difficult life cannot be a normal state of affairs. After the enlargement of the Communities, when they will have reached their ‘cruising regime’ as regards their composition, it will be essential to give them structures which are equal to what is expected of them in our countries and outside our countries.

THE DESTINY OF THE SO-CALLED SOCIALIST SOCIETIES OF EASTERN Europe is one of the great questions of our time. The communist counter-reformation may plunge Eastern Europe into the same kind of somnolent torpor which the original Counter-reformation imposed on Southern Europe, and from which it has not yet really recovered. The abortive Prague Spring will remain a good source of evidence for what countervailing forces are available, which could possibly save Eastern Europe from such a fate. It was a revolution of intellectuals, a fact which may perhaps have always augured ill for its final outcome, though it was a hopeful sign for the quality of its literary and scholarly accompaniment.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE HAS MORE THAN enough characteristics to arouse admiration amongst those who support it and astonishment or scepticism among everyone else. A rapid glance backwards is enough to establish that their non-institutional legitimation is a factor common to practically all revolutions, ancient or modern. To such a point that political theory has devised the category of revolutionuy legitimation in order to compare it with other (religious, dynastic, historical, democratic etc.) categories. Revolutionary movements have always sought justification of their raison d'être in the causes or goals which have motivated them. Usually these goals have been in conflict with those forming the bases of the pre-existing system of political institutions. Hence revolution seems to be associated with conflict against institutionalism, and the triumph of the revolution seems to have involved the institutional collapse of the former regime.

THE VEDEL GROUP HAD THE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE FIRST such working party set up by the Commission of the European Communities involving the ten countries of the proposed enlarged Community. The membership of fourteen reflected the model for the new Commission, one from the smaller and two from the larger countries. The decision was taken by the Commission on 22 July 1971 to set up a working party of independent experts to advise it in its preparations for the summit the following year, in which one of the headings for discussion by the heads of governments of the ten countries would be the institutions of the Community. The Group first met in October 1971 with a mandate ‘to examine all the implications of extending the powers of the European Parliament’. It reported on 25 March 1972.

As a member of the Group I shall attempt a personal assessment of the political implications of the report. I have not consulted with any of my thirteen colleagues; I do not purport to represent their views, nor are they to be taken as sharing or endorsing in any way my personal analysis in this article.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS IS EVERYTHING – OR IT IS NOTHING. Superficially, these appear to be the only logical positions that can be maintained when considering the relationship of comparative politics to the various areas and divisions of the discipline of political science. The now old-fashioned use of the title to indicate either a small number of country studies loosely linked by structural comparison, or a somewhat broader field of institutional comparison, whatever the pedagogic arguments of coherence or convenience, possesses neither logical boundary nor scientific integrity. Yet once that treacherous one step further is taken in the directions of functional comparison, or, further, consideration of the ‘comparative method’ itself and the distinctions between comparative politics and, say, political theory, political sociology or political analysis disappear completely.

WE PROPOSE TO ANALYSE HERE SOME OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS POSED by the attempt to pursue ‘the Chilean road to socialism’, and in particular to assess the possibilities of successfully following this path within the political and constitutional framework in being when Allende became president, always bearing in mind that he came to power with the support of 36·3% (or little more than one third) of the popular vote. It is necessary first to discuss the constitutional system, the background to the 1970 election and the election campaign. This will serve to place Allende and his coalition in proper perspective. Subsequently we will attempt to analyse the legal and political resources at Allende's disposal after his election in order to see if the powers these gave him were sufficient for the Unidad Popular to honour its commitments and the alternative strategies he could have pursued when and if these resources proved insufficient. Finally, there will be some discussion of the present state of the Unidad Popular, and its future prospects.

AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE IN WHICH DOMESTIC POLICY PROVIDED the major issues for party debate in West Germany, the determination of the Brandt government on taking office to engage itself in activities designed to ‘normalize’ relations with the Eastern Bloc has had notable effects on the West German parties. The political climate has altered; partisanship has been intensified; the Basic Law has been tested in novel circumstances; and the governing coalition and the apprentice opposition have both faced trials and tensions in terms of their party base.

The new Ostpolitik has had its effects on the political climate in terms of the first use of the constructive vote of no confidence, the erosion of the coalition majority, the pressures for a premature general election; but the short-term and longer-term effects on the West German parties are likely to be of greater significance. This article seeks to assess the significance of the Ostpolitik for the government and opposition parties. For, whatever the benefits or disadvantages which the Ostpolitik may bring to the Federal Republic in intrinsic terms, it is already clear that it has modified considerably the pre-1969 pattern of party politics.

IN A RECENT TALK GIVEN BEFORE THE STUDENTS OF THE SCHOOL OF Commerce in Paris Monsieur Michel Debré identified three forms of political oppositions : programmatic opposition typical of the ‘Anglo-Saxon countries’ opposition to the regime, prevalent in the Third and Fourth French Republics and revolutionary opposition, directed against the social and economic order. Unless the French Communist Party, he noted, accepts the republican regime based on peaceful alternations of the government and unless, he added for good measure, it ceases to be influenced by an outside power, it cannot become an ‘opposition’. The only opposition that is acceptable, he concluded – and nobody who knows Mr Debré's political career under the Fourth Republic can miss the irony – is the one that recognizes the legitimacy of the institutions and acts for the purpose of replacing the government.

IN THEIR ANALYSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND THE TECHNOlogical state contemporary Western writers reveal a wide spectrum of opinions, and this article must evidently consider some at least of these, though unfortunately none at great length. First, the anguish of Arendt:

BEFORE 1969 THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MAJOR POLITICAL parties used all sorts of determinants: linguistic, tribal, philosophical, legal, and administrative to elaborate norms – objective or not – for the allocation of university finance on the basis of the absolute rule of parity. For the Belgian universities, the reforms of 1969, the logical result of the ‘politicization’ movement of 1968, meant the introduction into the previous system of institutions and procedures such as constituent assemblies , elections, playing at politics, taking at least a minimal part in the general management and establishing techniques for the sharing of resources.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT CHILEAN POLITICAL PROCESS MAY serve to underline some features of the Marxist theory of the state and of the relationship between social classes and institutional structures. Few countries offer such a clear example as Chile of the impact of the elements forming the ideological superstructure on the social and economic mechanisms which operate at the level of the infrastructure. Its long, bourgeois democratic tradition has led to the accumulation of many juridical and institutional elements, to which formal respect has been given, and which have built up a system of domination thanks to the acquiescence of other social sectors. The achievement of a high degree of consensus had been the other side of the face of a weak bourgeoisie, and in the blind logic of weak dominant classes, they have transformed their superstructure into their Achilles's heel. For the Chilean political process has shown how political power can transform itself into an instrument which will destroy the unity of the institutionalized power structure of the bourgeois state, when it is controlled by an alliance of social forces which escape the influence of the dominant class and its allies.

A SURVEY OF THE HEADLINES IN THE CHILEAN PRESS DURING THE first year of the Unidad Popular (UP) government might give the unwary observer the impression that the period has been characterized by a succession of subversive plots. Conspiracy theories have abounded and dramatic public announcements (like modern ceremonies of exorcism), have marked the official recognition of each theory while presaging its prompt disappearance from the front pages of the newspapers and from the view of an increasingly sceptical populace.

Events over the past year more than justify the alarm of the UP. The ‘peaceful road to socialism’ has been obstructed by the activities of groups of the extreme left and the extreme right which have each committed one major political assasination.

IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT FACTIONALISM WHILST APPARENT IN THE Labour Party has no counterpart within the Conservative Party. For example, the authors of a study on the opinions of backbench conservative MPs concluded that disagreements are amongst ‘ad hoc groups’ and that as new issues arise ‘the coherence of the former groups dissolves and new alignments appear. . . .’ A more recent survey of conservative backbenchers concurs with this and argues that the ‘criss-crossing pattern of cleavage (amongst conservative MPs) inhibits the development of Tory factions analogous to those in the Labour Party. Allies on one issue either become enemies on the next, or else simply do not feel strongly enough on the next issue to want necessarily to work together.’ A similar sort of conclusion has been reached by Richard Rose who states that the Conservative Party contains differing sets of political attitudes which remain constant whilst the party member will constantly shift from one attitude to another. Thus he concludes that the Conservative Party is a party of tendencies rather than factions; that it lacks a hard core of organized members within the party adhering to a set of principles which they are attempting to impose on the party in general. These conclusions are typical of a general belief about the political process within the Conservative Party.

WITH THE RECENT PUBLICATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE ‘Prison Notebooks’, Gramsci studies may safely be said to have ‘come in from the cold’. While Isaac Deutscher goes too far in his claim for ‘the oblivion to which Gramsci's memory was consigned during the Stalin era’, considerable parts of his political career remained obscure, and evidence of his disagreement with many of the orthodoxies of his time, and with PCI decisions associated with them, has only recently been forthcoming. Publication of his writings has had in general to wait for the ideological relaxation which followed the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Publication of his work in the Soviet Union itself was initiated in 1957, and a three-volume selection eventually appeared. In Yugoslavia, a Selected Works appeared in 1959. Yet it was evident that even in an era of declared de-Stalinization, Gramsci's writings could remain something of an embarrassment to communist orthodoxy.