My theory of the determinants of mass support for the PRI presented in the previous chapter stresses a series of causal relationships that link the socio-economic structure with the propensity to support the autocratic regime or to defect to the opposition. This chapter provides empirical evidence, based on aggregate socioeconomic indicators, for several of my theoretical claims. Some of these relationships, and in particular the correlation between underdevelopment and support for the PRI, have long been noted in classic studies of Mexican politics. Other correlations are less well understood. This chapter also serves to provide some basic “stylized facts” about the dynamics of mass support for the PRI and the decline of that support over the years.

Economic Performance and Support for the PRI

From 1929 until 1982, the PRI was successful in generating political stability and economic growth. The PRI's predecessor, the PNR, emerged in 1929 as a compromise among warlords and revolutionary leaders to put an end to a long period of political violence. The compromise was successful, and for more than seventy years political elites in Mexico settled their disagreements through the regime's institutional channels, seldom resorting to violence.

The PRI also produced economic growth. Before the founding of the PNR, the economy was in dismal shape, at least in part due to internal political instability. Indeed, the average growth rate in the twenties was −0.93 percent.