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9 - CONCLUSION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2009

Beatriz Magaloni
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
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Summary

This book has focused on the study of the logic of a particular form of autocracy and its demise. The Mexican PRI held multiparty elections with clockwork precision for all elective offices, including the presidency. Yet an authoritarian government hid behind the façade of these elections. As argued by Schedler (2002), “electoral autocracies” such as the PRI constitute one of the most common forms of autocracies in the world today.

Elections under Autocracy

The Mexican PRI was designed with the explicit intent to prevent personal dictatorship. Since its creation in 1929, the PRI used regular elections as a means to share the spoils of office among ruling party politicians and to prevent any single individual from grabbing it all. For that purpose reelection for all elective offices, including the presidency, was ruled out. I hope to have shown that one of the pillars propping up the PRI regime was its massive electoral support. Even when elections were not competitive and the opposition could not dream of winning, the PRI engaged in the mobilization of voters. During the golden years of the PRI, elections were primarily a display of might – billboards, roads, and towns were painted in the party's colors (the same as those of the Mexican flag), and party rallies were packed with voters who were performing their duties, as if somebody was watching them.

Type
Chapter
Information
Voting for Autocracy
Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico
, pp. 257 - 272
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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  • CONCLUSION
  • Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Voting for Autocracy
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510274.010
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  • CONCLUSION
  • Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Voting for Autocracy
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510274.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • CONCLUSION
  • Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Voting for Autocracy
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510274.010
Available formats
×