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7 - The philosophy of probability

Martin Peterson
Affiliation:
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
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Summary

Philosophers disagree about what probability is. Somewhat roughly put, there are two camps in this debate, objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists maintain that statements about probability refer to facts in the external world. If you claim that the probability is fifty per cent that the coin I hold in my hand will land heads up when tossed, then you are – according to the objectivist – referring to a property of the external world, such as the physical propensity of the coin to land heads up about every second time it is tossed. From an intuitive point of view, this seems to be a very plausible idea. However, subjectivists disagree with this picture. Subjectivists deny that statements about probability can be understood as claims about the external world. What is, for instance, the probability that your suitor will ask you to marry him? It seems rather pointless to talk about some very complex propensity of that person, or count the number of marriage proposals that other people make, because this does not tell us anything about the probability that you will be faced with a marriage proposal. If it is true that the probability is, say, 1/2 then it is true because of someone's mental state.

According to the subjective view, statements about probability refer to the degree to which the speaker believes something.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • The philosophy of probability
  • Martin Peterson, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
  • Book: An Introduction to Decision Theory
  • Online publication: 05 June 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800917.008
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  • The philosophy of probability
  • Martin Peterson, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
  • Book: An Introduction to Decision Theory
  • Online publication: 05 June 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800917.008
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The philosophy of probability
  • Martin Peterson, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
  • Book: An Introduction to Decision Theory
  • Online publication: 05 June 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800917.008
Available formats
×