Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The decision matrix
- 3 Decisions under ignorance
- 4 Decisions under risk
- 5 Utility
- 6 The mathematics of probability
- 7 The philosophy of probability
- 8 Why should we accept the preference axioms?
- 9 Causal vs. evidential decision theory
- 10 Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian decision theory
- 11 Game theory I: Basic concepts and zero-sum games
- 12 Game theory II: Nonzero-sum and cooperative games
- 13 Social choice theory
- 14 Overview of descriptive decision theory
- Appendix A Glossary
- Appendix B Proof of the von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem
- Further reading
- Index
- References
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core
Further reading
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The decision matrix
- 3 Decisions under ignorance
- 4 Decisions under risk
- 5 Utility
- 6 The mathematics of probability
- 7 The philosophy of probability
- 8 Why should we accept the preference axioms?
- 9 Causal vs. evidential decision theory
- 10 Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian decision theory
- 11 Game theory I: Basic concepts and zero-sum games
- 12 Game theory II: Nonzero-sum and cooperative games
- 13 Social choice theory
- 14 Overview of descriptive decision theory
- Appendix A Glossary
- Appendix B Proof of the von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem
- Further reading
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Information
- An Introduction to Decision Theory , pp. 308 - 313Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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